Question 1

Ali, Feroz, Sudarsan Rajagopal, Venkata S. Raman, and Roshan John. 2018. “Pharmaceutical Patent Grants in India: How Our Safeguards against Evergreening Have Failed, and Why the System Must Be Reformed.” accessibsa. https://www.accessibsa.org/media/2018/04/Pharmaceutical-Patent-Grants-in-India.pdf.

Abstract: Not available

Link: https://www.accessibsa.org/media/2018/04/Pharmaceutical-Patent-Grants-in-India.pdf.

Answer

Abstract: Not available. Link: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781785362606/27_chapter19.xhtml.

Answer

Abstract: Not available. Link: https://accessibsa.org/media/2019/08/Medicines-under-Exclusivity-Situation-funded-by-the-Ministry-of-Health.pdf.

Answer

Abstract: Patents are the most important way by which inventors can protect their invention and the income that might derive from innovations developed in return for the full disclosure that enters into public domain after expiration of the patent term. In certain domains, monopolies over patent rights are being extended beyond the patent period, particularly in high-revenue-earning pharmaceutical sectors. This article presents evergreening strategies that are regularly employed by the giant branded pharmaceutical firms as a tactic to bypass existing patent laws and limit generic competition in the marketplace. The article examines the implications of evergreening for different stakeholders, including branded and generic drug companies and consumers. Problems that arise due to evergreening are also discussed. The frequency of such strategies necessitates strong patent interpretations that are protective of the spirit of patent laws. Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160791X1000076X?via%3Dihub.

Answer

Abstract: The current patentability standards for pharmaceutical inventions, as well as strategic patenting used by pharmaceutical companies, have substantially impacted access to affordable medicines. This has been especially detrimental for developing countries, which are under significant pressure to remain compliant with their international and bilateral obligations, while also providing their people with essential drugs. In order to improve access to medicines, developing countries may choose from a range of various mechanisms that may help to facilitate such access, while also allowing them to remain compliant with their international and bilateral obligations. This policy brief suggests that one of such mechanisms is to strengthen the obviousness requirement by applying the ‘obvious to try with a reasonable expectation of success’ test to pharmaceutical follow-on inventions. It is argued that the application of this test may be an effective tool in addressing the negative effect of strategic patenting. It may help to prevent the extension of patent protection and market exclusivity of existing drugs by pharmaceutical companies and, as a result, may open such medicines to generic competition. Link: https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/PB59_The-obvious-to-try-method-of-addressing-strategic-patenting_EN.pdf.

Answer

Abstract: In 2015 the United Nations Development Programme issued a document entitled Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Patent Examination: Examining Pharmaceutical Patents from a Public Health Perspective (the “Guidelines”). The heart of the Guidelines is a category-by-category examination of eight types of “secondary” pharmaceutical patent claims: Markush claims; selection patents; polymorphs; enantiomers; salts; ethers and esters; compositions; doses; combinations; prodrugs; metabolites; and new medical uses. The Guidelines advise patent offices to apply heightened patentability requirements to these claims in a manner that would effectively deny patent protection to important pharmaceutical innovations currently afforded patent protection. In particular, the Guidelines postulate that many forms of pharmaceutical innovation are inherently routine, and absent some sort of exceptional circumstance should be treated as obvious/non-inventive, and hence unpatentable. In my experience, however, the Guidelines’ assumption that many types of pharmaceutical inventions are inherently obvious and undeserving of patent protection is incorrect, and based on an oversimplified view of how these inventions come about. This article provides an evidence-based response to the Guidelines that refutes, or at least qualifies, some of the significant conclusions and recommendations set forth by its author. Link: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833983.

Answer

Abstract [only the conference abstract is publicly available]: Objectives: To explore the situation of ‘evergreening’ of pharmaceutical patents in Thailand during 2000-2010. Methods: The pharmaceutical patent applications during2000-2010 were re-examined by using the guideline for the examination of pharmaceutical patents in Thailand. The guideline was developed from the guideline elaborated by the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the World Health Organization (2007) and adopted from the focus group discussions among key informants including academics; the Department of Intellectual Property, Ministry of Commerce; Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association; and Thai Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association. The patent application examiners were also standardized until reaching the almost perfect agreement among the examiners (kappa coefficient¼0.89). Results: Patents over minor incremental developments (often termed as ‘evergreening’ patents) may be used to exclude generic competition and thereby block access to affordable drugs. Of the 2,034 patent applications during2000-2010, 1,960 were categorized as ‘evergreening’. The ‘evergreening’ ranged from new use of a known sub-stance (73.7%), formulations (36.4%), markush claims (34.7%), and combinations (15.2%). Top three of the patent application holders, (58.2%) in Thailand were US, German, and Swiss. Only 0.5% of patent applications were from Thai companies. Conclusions: This study was presented the problems associated to the pharmaceutical patenting of minor incremental developments. The large number of patents applied for was not a reliable indicator of innovation. It means that patent strategies on pharmaceutical products in Thailand may have a direct negative impact on access to medicines by blocking generic competition. Therefore, rigorous criteria to assess the inventive step of patent applications relating to pharmaceuticals should be applied so as to ensure the patents are only granted where genuine contributions to the state of the art are made. Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1551741112001982?via%3Dihub.

Answer

Abstract: Since China launched its national HIV/AIDS treatment program in 2003, the issue of ARV access has become a major obstacle to expanding treatment and prolonging patients’ lives. Examining the efforts and limitations of multiple stakeholders in the process of attaining full access to ARVs in China, this paper presents and analyzes the problems surrounding ARV access in China from different standpoints, focusing on the epidemic situation, capacities and constraints on domestic production, legal and policy barriers hampering access to ARVs, and noteworthy civil society responses and advocacy for ARV access. This paper not only describes how national stakeholders play their respective roles in the process of reaching national objectives in terms of access to ARVs, but also offers a comparative view of international stakeholders and practices respectively. This comparison in turn assists us in exploring and testing out ways for China to overcome the obstacles blocking access to ARVs. Link: http://www.abiaids.org.br/_img/media/Intellectual_Property_internet.pdf.

Question 2

Amin, Tahir, and Aaron S. Kesselheim. 2012. “Secondary Patenting Of Branded Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study Of How Patents On Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended For Decades.” Health Affairs 31 (10): 2286–94. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2012.0107.

Abstract: Pharmaceutical manufacturers rely on patents to protect their intellectual property and often seek to extend market exclusivity for their products to maximize their return on investment. One method is by obtaining patents on features other than the original active drug ingredient, including secondary patents on alternate formulations of the drug or on methods of administration. This article examines how secondary patents can extend market exclusivity and thus delay generic competition, using as an example two key antiretroviral drugs for the management of HIV: ritonavir (Norvir) and lopinavir/ritonavir (Kaletra). We identified 108 patents, which together could delay generic competition until at least 2028—twelve years after the expiration of the patents on the drugs’ base compounds and thirty-nine years after the first patents on ritonavir were filed. Some of the secondary patents that were reviewed were found to be of questionable inventiveness. We argue that increased transparency for existing patents, stricter patentability standards, and increased opportunities to challenge patent applications and patents could reduce inappropriate market exclusivity extensions on brand-name drugs and open the door to lower-cost generics.

Link: https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2012.0107.

Question 3

Beall, Reed F., Jason W. Nickerson, Warren A. Kaplan, and Amir Attaran. 2016. “Is Patent ‘Evergreening’ Restricting Access to Medicine/Device Combination Products?” Edited by Heinz Fehrenbach. PLOS ONE 11 (2): e0148939. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0148939.

Abstract: Background: Not all new drug products are truly new. Some are the result of marginal innovation and incremental patenting of existing products, but in such a way that confers no major therapeutic improvement. This phenomenon, pejoratively known as “evergreening”, can allow manufacturers to preserve market exclusivity, but without significantly bettering the standard of care. Other studies speculate that evergreening is especially problematic for medicine/device combination products, because patents on the device component may outlast expired patents on the medicine component, and thereby keep competing, possibly less-expensive generic products off the market. Materials and Methods: We focused on four common conditions that are often treated by medicine/device product combinations: asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), diabetes, and severe allergic reactions. The patent data for a sample of such products (n = 49) for treating these conditions was extracted from the United States Food and Drug Administration’s Orange Book. Additional patent-related data (abstracts, claims, etc.) were retrieved using LexisNexis TotalPatent. Comparisons were then made between each product’s device patents and medicine patents.

Results: Unexpired device patents exist for 90 percent of the 49 medicine/device product combinations studied, and were the only sort of unexpired patent for 14 products. Overall, 55 percent of the 235 patents found by our study were device patents. Comparing the last-to-expire device patent to that of the last-to-expire active ingredient patent, the median additional years of patent protection afforded by device patents was 4.7 years (range: 1.3–15.2 years).

Conclusion: Incremental, patentable innovation in devices to extend the overall patent protection of medicine/device product combinations is very common. Whether this constitutes “evergreening” depends on whether these incremental innovations and the years of extra patent protection they confer are proportionately matched by therapeutic improvements in the standard of care, which is highly debatable.

Link: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0148939.

Question 4

Bensadon, Martin, and Ivan Alfredo Poli. 2012. “Prepare for Strict Rules against Pharmaceutical Patents.” Managing Intellectual Property, 2012. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/manintpr221&id=38&collection=journals&index=.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/manintpr221&id=38&collection=journals&index=.

Question 5

Bergström, Jenny. 2015. “The Efficiency of India’s Patent Layering Regime – Section 3(d) from Scientific Terminology to Patenting Implications.” IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 46 (6): 665–81. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-015-0375-3.

Abstract: Amidst the controversy about promoting innovation through patents while maintaining access to medicines, India's 2005 Patents (Amendment) Act on patent layering offers a novel attempt at entering a middle path. Genuine advance is to be filtered from “evergreening” by requiring new forms of known substances to display enhanced therapeutic efficacy in order to be patentable. For this purpose, substance derivatives are presumed to be the same as the original known substance. While this heightened patentability standard for incremental innovation has been widely discussed from economic, political and legal standpoints, it has not yet been fully considered on natural scientific grounds. In this article, the Sec. 3(d) criteria “enhanced therapeutic efficacy” and the negative presumption on substance derivatives will be explored on the scientific basis of drug development in order to assess the regime's efficiency. This analysis reveals that “therapeutic” and “efficacy” are not entirely suitable as patentability criteria, while the presumption may entail undesired effects. Section 3(d) as it stands offers a novel approach to limiting evergreening and endorsing some incremental innovation, but much can be gained from a closer congruence between natural and legal scientific terminology in the pharmaceutical patenting context. A few interpretive adaptations are proposed to further fine-tune it to this end.

Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs40319-015-0375-3.

Question 6

Blasi, Gabriel Di. 2018. “Reaching a Milestone in Pharmaceutical Patenting in Brazil.” Pharmaceutical Patent Analyst 7 (6): 229–33. https://doi.org/10.4155/ppa-2018-0025.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: https://www.future-science.com/doi/10.4155/ppa-2018-0025.

Question 7

Abbas, Muhammad Z. 2019. “Evergreening of Pharmaceutical Patents: A Blithe Disregard for the Rationale of the Patent System.” Journal of Generic Medicines: The Business Journal for the Generic Medicines Sector 15 (2): 53–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/1741134319848797.

Abstract: Evergreening of pharmaceutical patents has emerged as a serious challenge for access to affordable drugs as it aims to delay the generic competition by extending the length of the exclusivity period beyond the legitimate patent term without any considerable improvement in therapeutic benefits of the already patented pharmaceutical drug. This paper endeavours to question the legitimacy of the evergreening of pharmaceutical patents. This study applies all the recognized theories in support of the patent system – namely the ‘natural law’ or ‘natural rights’ theory, the ‘reward by monopoly’ theory, the ‘monopoly-profit incentive’ theory, the ‘exchange for secrets’ theory or the ‘contract’ theory, and the ‘prospect’ theory – to the practice of evergreening of drug patents in order to check whether or not any of these theories can be used to justify the practice. The study concludes that the practice of evergreening is not consistent with any of these theories and therefore lacks any plausible justification.

Link: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1741134319848797.

Question 8

Abud, María José, Bronwyn Hall, and Christian Helmers. 2015. “An Empirical Analysis of Primary and Secondary Pharmaceutical Patents in Chile.” Edited by L. Michel Espinoza-Fonseca. PLOS ONE 10 (4): e0124257. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0124257.

Abstract: We analyze the patent filing strategies of foreign pharmaceutical companies in Chile distinguishing between “primary” (active ingredient) and “secondary” patents (patents on modified compounds, formulations, dosages, particular medical uses, etc.). There is prior evidence that secondary patents are used by pharmaceutical originator companies in the U. S. and Europe to extend patent protection on drugs in length and breadth. Using a novel dataset that comprises all drugs registered in Chile between 1991 and 2010 as well as the corresponding patents and trademarks, we find evidence that foreign originator companies pursue similar strategies in Chile. We find a primary to secondary patents ratio of 1:4 at the drug-level, which is comparable to the available evidence for Europe; most secondary patents are filed over several years following the original primary patent and after the protected active ingredient has obtained market approval in Chile. This points toward effective patent term extensions through secondary patents. Secondary patents dominate “older” therapeutic classes like anti-ulcer and anti-depressants. In contrast, newer areas like anti-virals and anti-neoplastics (anti-cancer) have a much larger share of primary patents.

Link: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0124257.

Question 9

Carrier, Michael A. 2019. “PRODUCT HOPPING: THE US APPROACH.” In EU Law of Competition and Trade in the Pharmaceutical Sector, by Pablo Figueroa and Alejandro Guerrero, 716–32. Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785362613.00028.

Question 10

Chaves, Gabriela Costa, Marcela Cristina Fogaca Vieira, Roberta Dorneles F. da Costa, and Mariani Nunes Sadock Vianna. 2019. Medicines under Exclusivity Situation Funded by the Ministry of Health: Analysis of the Patent Situation and Public Procurement. 1st ed. Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil: Fundacao Oswaldo Cruz and Escola Nacional de Saude Publica Sergio Arouca. https://accessibsa.org/media/2019/08/Medicines-under-Exclusivity-Situation-funded-by-the-Ministry-of-Health.pdf.

Question 11

Chandrasekharan, Subhashini, Tahir Amin, Joyce Kim, Eliane Furrer, Anna-Carin Matterson, Nina Schwalbe, and Aurélia Nguyen. 2015. “Intellectual Property Rights and Challenges for Development of Affordable Human Papillomavirus, Rotavirus and Pneumococcal Vaccines: Patent Landscaping and Perspectives of Developing Country Vaccine Manufacturers.” Vaccine 33 (46): 6366–70. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.08.063.

Abstract: The success of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance depends on the vaccine markets providing appropriate, afforable vaccines at sufficient and reliable quantities. Gavi’s current supplier base for new and underutilized vaccines, such as the human papillomavirus (HPV), rotavirus, and the pneumococcal conjugate vaccine is very small. There is growing concern that following globalization of laws on intellectual property rights (IPRs) through trade agreements, IPRs are impeding new manufacturers from entering the market with competing vaccines. This article examines the extent to which IPRs, specifically patents, can create such obstacles, in particular for developing country vaccine manufacturers (DCVMs). Through building patent landscapes in Brazil, China, and India and interviews with manufacturers and experts in the field, we found intense patenting activity for the HPV and pneumococcal vaccines that could potentially delay the entry of new manufacturers. Increased transparency around patenting of vaccine technologies, stricter patentability criteria suited for local development needs and strengthening of IPRs management capabilities where relevant, may help reduce impediments to market entry for new manufacturers and ensure a competitive supplier base for quality vaccines at sustainably low prices.

Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264410X15011913?via%3Dihub.

Question 12

Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH). 2006. “Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights: Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health.” World Health Organization (WHO). https://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/report/en/.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: https://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/report/en/.

Question 13

Correa, Carlos. 2007a. Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement. Oxford Commentaries on International Law. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: https://ideas.repec.org/b/oxp/obooks/9780199271283.html.

Question 14

Correa, Carlos. 2007b. “Guidelines for the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents: Developing a Public Health Perspective. A Working Paper.” International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, World Health Organization, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s21419en/s21419en.pdf.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s21419en/s21419en.pdf.

Question 15

Correa, Carlos. 2011a. “Pharmaceutical Innovation, Incremental Patenting and Compulsory Licensing.” Colombia: Fundacion Instituto para la Investigacion del Medicamento en los Sistemas de Salud. https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/47912/IDL-47912.pdf.

Abstract: Despite in decline in the discovery of new chemical entities, there is a significant proliferation of patents on pharmaceutical products that cover minor, incremental innovations. The application of low standards of patentability does not promote innovation in pharmaceuticals in the studied countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India and South Africa) but rather the use of the patent system to delay or block generic competition. The study of patents granted in the five countries shows the acceptance of overly broad claims, an overwhelming dominance of foreign patenting and a little research and development activities regarding diseases that predominate in developing countries. Insufficient information made available on the covered products makes it difficult to monitor the process of grant and to determine the patent status of particular medicines.

Link: https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/47912/IDL-47912.pdf.

Question 16

Correa, Carlos. 2011b. “Pharmaceutical Innovation, Incremental Patenting and Compulsory Licensing.” Research Paper no. 41. South Centre. https://www.southcentre.int/research-paper-41-september-2011/#more-1440.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: https://www.southcentre.int/research-paper-41-september-2011/#more-1440.

Question 17

Correa, Carlos. 2013. “Is Section 3(d) Consistent with TRIPS?” Economic and Political Weekly 48 (32): 49–52.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23528031?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

Question 18

Correa, Carlos. 2014a. “Tackling the Proliferation of Patents: How to Avoid Undue Limitations to Competition and the Public Domain.” Research Paper no. 52. South Centre. https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/RP52_Tackling-the-Proliferation-of-Patents-rev_EN.pdf.

Abstract: Not available.

https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/RP52_Tackling-the-Proliferation-of-Patents-rev_EN.pdf.

Question 19

Correa, Carlos. 2014b. “Patent Examination and Legal Fictions: How Rights Are Created on Feet of Clay.” Research Paper no. 58. South Centre. https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/RP58_Patent-Examination-Legal-Fictions_EN.pdf.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/RP58_Patent-Examination-Legal-Fictions_EN.pdf.

Question 20

Correa, Carlos. 2016a. “Implementing Pro-Competitive Criteria for the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents.” Research Paper no. 64. South Centre. https://ipaccessmeds.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ProCompetitive-Criteria-Examination-pharma-patents.pdf.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: https://ipaccessmeds.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ProCompetitive-Criteria-Examination-pharma-patents.pdf.

Question 21

Correa, Carlos. 2016b. Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Patent Examination: Examining Pharmaceutical Patents from a Public Health Perspective. United Nations Development Program. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.1659.3526.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.1659.3526.

Question 22

Drahos, Peter. 2008. “‘Trust Me’: Patent Offices in Developing Countries.” American Journal of Law & Medicine 34: 151–74. http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=EAIM&u=hei&id=GALE%7CA181990664&v=2.1&it=r.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=EAIM&u=hei&id=GALE%7CA181990664&v=2.1&it=r.

Question 23

Ducimetière, Clara. 2019. “Second Medical Use Patents - Legal Treatment and Public Health Issues.” South Centre. Research Papers 101. https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/RP101_Second-Medical-Use-Patents-Legal-Treatment-and-Public-Health-Issues_EN.pdf.

Abstract: This paper attempts to give an overview of the debate surrounding the patentability of new therapeutic uses for known active ingredients, both in developed and developing countries. After close scrutiny of international patentability standards, this paper concludes that second medical uses do not qualify per se for patent protection and have only been protected in several jurisdictions by means of a legal fiction. The increasing acceptance of second medical use patents seems to result from strategic patent filing from pharmaceutical companies to extend the life of existing patents, justified mainly for financial reasons. However, these practices have a detrimental impact on generic competition and, hence, on the access to medicines and the public health, in particular in developing countries. Therefore, this paper argues that a sound patent policy in line with public health objectives, in particular, an enhanced access to medicines, should not allow for the grant of second medical use patents.

Link: https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/RP101_Second-Medical-Use-Patents-Legal-Treatment-and-Public-Health-Issues_EN.pdf.

Question 24

Dwivedi, Gaurav, Sharanabasava Hallihosur, and Latha Rangan. 2010. “Evergreening: A Deceptive Device in Patent Rights.” Technology in Society 32 (4): 324–30. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2010.10.009.

Question 25

Feldman, Robin, and Connie Wang. 2017. “May Your Drug Price Be Ever Green.” SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3061567.

Abstract: Presenting the first comprehensive study of evergreening, this article examines the extent to which evergreening behavior—which can be defined as artificially extending the protection cliff—may contribute to the problem. The author analyses all drugs on the market between 2005 and 2015, combing through 60,000 data points to examine every instance in which a company added a new patent or exclusivity. The results show a startling departure from the classic conceptualization of intellectual property protection for pharmaceuticals. Rather than creating new medicines, pharmaceutical companies are largely recycling and repurposing old ones. Specifically, 78% of the drugs associated with new patents were not new drugs, but existing ones, and extending protection is particularly pronounced among blockbuster drugs. Once companies start down the road of extending protection, they show a tendency to return to the well, with the majority adding more than one extension and 50% becoming serial offenders. The problem is growing across time.

Link: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3061567.

Question 26

Gaudry, Kate S. 2011. “Evergreening: A Common Practice to Protect New Drugs: The Common Strategy of Evergreening Using Patents and Other Exclusivity Periods Likely Contributes to the Total Incentives That Justify a Pharmaceutical Company’s Investment in a New Drug.” Nature Biotechnology 29 (10): 876+. https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A270813255/EAIM?u=hei&sid=EAIM&xid=925ad314.

Abstract: Pharmaceutical companies using an evergreening strategy -- extend both total patent monopolies and total exclusivities granted by US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) -- complex time-evolving and scope-varying approach taken by pharmaceutical companies when pursuing exclusivity periods -- patent-associated exclusivity -- FDA-approval exclusivity -- studies show pharmaceutical companies will expand their R and D programs when they have more opportunities to make profits -- current R and D efforts partly supported by additional exclusivities offered by evergreening strategies.

Link: https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A270813255/EAIM?u=hei&sid=EAIM&xid=925ad314.

Question 27

Gurgula, Olga. 2019. “The ‘obvious to Try’ Method of Addressing Strategic Patenting: How Developing Countries Can Utilise Patent Law to Facilitate Acess to Medicines.” Policy brief no. 59. South Centre. https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/PB59_The-obvious-to-try-method-of-addressing-strategic-patenting_EN.pdf.

Question 28

Hemphill, C. Scott, and Bhaven N. Sampat. 2012. “Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals.” Journal of Health Economics 31 (2): 327–39. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2012.01.004.

Abstract: Observers worry that generic patent challenges are on the rise and reduce the effective market life of drugs. A related concern is that challenges disproportionately target high-sales drugs, reducing market life for these “blockbusters.” To study these questions, we examine new data on generic entry over the past decade. We show that challenges are more common for higher sales drugs. We also demonstrate a slight increase in challenges over this period, and a sharper increase for early challenges. Despite this, effective market life is stable across drug sales categories, and has hardly changed over the decade. To better understand these results, we examine which patents are challenged on each drug, and show that lower quality and later expiring patents disproportionately draw challenges. Overall, this evidence suggests that challenges serve to maintain, not reduce, the historical baseline of effective market life, thereby limiting the effectiveness of “evergreening” by branded firms.

Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629612000057?via%3Dihub.

Question 29

Holman, Christopher M. 2017. “In Defense of Secondary Pharmaceutical Patents: A Response to the UN’s Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Patent Examination.” Indiana Law Review 50: 759. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833983.

Question 30

Holman, Christopher M., Timo Minssen, and Eric M. Solovy. 2018. “Patentability Standards for Follow-On Pharmaceutical Innovation.” Biotechnology Law Report 37 (3): 131–61. https://doi.org/10.1089/blr.2018.29073.cmh.

Abstract: Follow-on pharmaceutical innovation occurring after the initial discovery of a drug active ingredient plays an important, but at times underappreciated, role in providing innovative solutions to compelling medical needs. Examples of follow-on innovation include new forms of a drug with improved safety-efficacy profiles, new formulations and dosages providing improved patient outcomes, and new methods of using an established drug more safely or to treat new indications. Patents play a critical role in incentivizing the research, development, testing, and ultimately commercialization of follow-on pharmaceutical innovation, and in doing so provide substantial benefits for public health and patients’ quality of life. There is, however, a body of literature characterizing patents directed towards follow-on innovations as ‘‘secondary pharmaceutical patents.’’ Some have even gone so far as to propose that the criteria for patentability should be enforced more stringently with respect to follow-on pharmaceutical inventions as compared to other inventions. The underlying assumption of such proposals is that follow-on pharmaceutical innovations are somehow secondary to other pharmaceutical innovation, and thus less deserving of patent protection. In this article, we refute the notion that follow-on pharmaceutical innovation should be categorically singled out for unfavorable treatment under the patent laws, and provide numerous examples of the value that follow-on innovation brings to medicine, and ultimately to patients. We also propose, in view of the international treaty obligations set out in, inter alia, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (‘‘TRIPS Agreement’’), standards and best practices for assessing the patentability of inventions arising out of follow-on pharmaceutical innovation. These are essentially the same stringent standards applicable to ‘‘primary’’ pharmaceutical innovation, and inventions in general. This article provides numerous examples from jurisdictions around the world in which patent offices and courts have applied the well-recognized requirements of patentability, including patent eligibility, novelty, inventive step and industrial application, to follow-on pharmaceutical inventions, and in so doing have advanced innovation in public health and ultimately the lives of patients.

Link: https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/blr.2018.29073.cmh.

Question 31

Kapczynski, Amy, Chan Park, and Bhaven Sampat. 2012. “Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of ‘Secondary’ Pharmaceutical Patents.” Edited by Barbara Mintzes. PLoS ONE 7 (12): e49470. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0049470.

Abstract: Background: While there has been much discussion by policymakers and stakeholders about the effects of ‘‘secondary patents’’ on the pharmaceutical industry, there is no empirical evidence on their prevalence or determinants. Characterizing the landscape of secondary patents is important in light of recent court decisions in the U.S. that may make them more difficult to obtain, and for developing countries considering restrictions on secondary patents.

Methodology/Principal Findings: We read the claims of the 1304 Orange Book listed patents on all new molecular entities approved in the U.S. between 1988 and 2005, and coded the patents as including chemical compound claims (claims covering the active molecule itself) and/or one of several types of secondary claims. We distinguish between patents with any secondary claims, and those with only secondary claims and no chemical compound claims (‘‘independent’’ secondary patents). We find that secondary claims are common in the pharmaceutical industry. We also show that independent secondary patents tend to be filed and issued later than chemical compound patents, and are also more likely to be filed after the drug is approved. When present, independent formulation patents add an average of 6.5 years of patent life (95% C.I.: 5.9 to 7.3 years), independent method of use patents add 7.4 years (95% C.I.: 6.4 to 8.4 years), and independent patents on polymorphs, isomers, prodrug, ester, and/or salt claims add 6.3 years (95% C.I.: 5.3 to 7.3 years). We also provide evidence that late-filed independent secondary patents are more common for higher sales drugs.

Conclusions/Significance: Policies and court decisions affecting secondary patenting are likely to have a significant impact on the pharmaceutical industry. Secondary patents provide substantial additional patent life in the pharmaceutical industry, at least nominally. Evidence that they are also more common for best-selling drugs is consistent with accounts of active ‘‘life cycle management’’ or ‘‘evergreening’’ of patent portfolios in the industry.

Link: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0049470.

Question 32

Kessomboon, N., U. Maleewong, K. Kijtiwatchakul, A. Eksaengsri, S. Atsawintarangkun, and J. Limpananont. 2012. “EvergreeningTM Patent: Playing Monopoly with Minor Incremental Development of Pharmaceuticals in Thailand.” Research in Social and Administrative Pharmacy 8 (6): e23–24. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sapharm.2012.08.055.

Question 33

Kessomboon, N., U. Sutapak, K. Kijtiwatchakul, A. Eksaengsri, and S. Atsawintarangkun. 2014. “Impact of ‘Evergreening’ Patent Applications of Pharmaceuticals on Pharmaceutical Expenditure.” Research in Social and Administrative Pharmacy 10 (5): e26–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sapharm.2014.07.072.

Abstract [only the conference abstract is publicly available]: To estimate the impact of ‘evergreening’ of pharmaceutical patent applications on pharmaceutical expenditure Methods: The new guidelines for the examination of pharmaceutical patents in Thailand which was developed from the guidelines elaborated by ICTSD, UN-CTAD, and WHO 2007 and adopted following focus group discussion among academics and stakeholders. The 59-selected items of pharmaceuticals, which were examined as the pharmaceutical patenting of minor incremental developments or evergreening, were then calculated the impact on pharmaceutical expenditures. The impact was estimated based upon the difference between the discounted cumulative expenditure of the relevant market over time horizon under innovative drug scenario and generic scenario. Thereafter, we simulated the 18-year potential additional expense on the 2010 unit price of the patented and monopolized non-patented medicines. Results: The patent applications of selected 59 drugs were examined and were found to be evergreening, It would result in the monopoly market for 32 years during the year 1996-2028. The cumulative market value of the evergreen was approximately 8,477.7 million baht (US$283 million). If we consider only the impact for 14 years monopoly during 1996-2010, the estimated lost from evergreening was 1,177.6 million baht (US$ 39 million).Therefore, if the Department of Intellectual Property consider to use the new guidelines to examine the patent applications, potential savings will be in the total amount of 8,477.7 million baht (US$ 283 million). Conclusions: This study has presented that patent strategies on pharmaceutical products in Thailand may have a direct negative impact on access to medicines by blocking generic competition. Therefore, rigorous criteria to assess the inventive step of patent applications relating to pharmaceuticals should be applied so as to ensure the patents are only granted where genuine contributions to the state of the art are made. Keywords: patent applications, evergreening, pharmaceutical expenditure.

Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1551741114001788?via%3Dihub.

Question 34

Kunisawa, Mitsuuchi and Viviane Yumy. 2009. “Patenting Pharmaceutical Inventions on Second Medical Uses in Brazil.” The Journal of World Intellectual Property 12 (4): 297–316. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1796.2009.00362.x.

Abstract: The current Brazilian industrial property law (Law 9279 of 14 May 1996) allows patents for pharmaceuticals, along with the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights provisions. Since 1999, after an amendment in the legislation, two governmental authorities—the Instituto Nacional da Propriedade Industrial (INPI) and the Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária (ANVISA)—have been concomitantly acting in the patent‐granting procedures for pharmaceuticals. The INPI is the office usually responsible for the examination and granting of patents, and the ANVISA is the agency primarily responsible for the granting of marketing approval of drugs. In a peculiar situation, the two institutions have been responsible for the granting or denial of applications and have very often been divergent in their positions. The patentability of pharmaceutical inventions claiming second medical use is an example. The purpose of this work is to analyze the current situation of the Brazilian patent‐granting system in the pharmaceutical field, with a special focus on the patentability of inventions claiming second medical use. It debates the two governmental positions and questions whether the existing conflicts are harmful to the system.

Link: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1747-1796.2009.00362.x.

Question 35

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018. Making Medicines Affordable: A National Imperative. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/24946.

Abstract: Over the past several decades, the biopharmaceutical sector in the United States has been successful in developing and delivering effective drugs for improving health and fighting disease, and many medical conditions that were long deemed untreatable can now be cured or managed effectively. At the same time, spending on prescription drugs has been rising dramatically, to the point that many individuals have difficulty paying for the drugs that they or their family members need. Drug costs are now a significant part of the nation's total spending on health care. A new report, Making Medicines Affordable: A National Imperative, from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine recommends a number of actions aimed at improving the affordability of prescription drugs without discouraging continued innovation in drug development. The report looks at a number of related areas including the role of generics and biosimilars, intellectual property, financial transparency, drug advertising, as well as insurance benefit designs.

Link: https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24946/making-medicines-affordable-a-national-imperative.

Question 36

Park, Chan. 2010. “Chapter 2A: Implementation of India’s Patent Law: A Review of Patents Granted by the Indian Patent Office.” In Five Years into the Product Patent Regime: India’s Response, by Sudip Chaudhuri, Chan Park, and K M Gopakumar. United Nations Development Programme. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.4584.0088.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.4584.0088.

Question 37

“PCT-Patent Prosecution Highway Pilot (PCT-PPH and Global PPH).” n.d. World Intellectual Property Organization. Accessed September 28, 2019. https://www.wipo.int/pct/en/filing/pct_pph.html.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: https://www.wipo.int/pct/en/filing/pct_pph.html.

Question 38

Reis, Renata, Marcela Fogaça Vieira, and Gabriela Costa Chaves. 2009. “Access to Medicines and Intellectual Property in Brazil: A Civil Society Experience.” In Intellectual Property Rights and Access to ARV Medicines: Civil Society Resistance in the Global South, edited by Renata Reis, Veriano Terto Júnior, Maria Cristina Pimenta, and Associação Brasileira Interdisciplinar de AIDS. Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil: ABIA. http://www.abiaids.org.br/_img/media/Intellectual_Property_internet.pdf.

Abstract: During the last decade the Brazilian civil society organizations have played a crucial role in the implementation and sustainability of universal access to AIDS drugs in the country. The following text intends to shed light on that experience, notably on the current effort of a group of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that work together in the fields of public health, HIV/AIDS, and intellectual property. This article addresses the Brazilian system of intellectual property law in respect to the country’s policy of universal access to AIDS medicines. It also presents the key working strategies of a Brazilian civil society group – GTPI/REBRIP – in tackling the main identified problems and challenges that it has identified in that regard in the field.

Link: http://www.abiaids.org.br/_img/media/Intellectual_Property_internet.pdf.

Question 39

Sampat, B. N., and T. Amin. 2013. “How Do Public Health Safeguards in Indian Patent Law Affect Pharmaceutical Patenting in Practice?” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 38 (4): 735–55. https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-2208594.

Abstract: The 1995 Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement required developing countries to grant product patents in pharmaceuticals. Developing countries have since explored various measures to ameliorate potential negative effects of the new laws on public health. A prominent example is India, whose post-TRIPS patent laws include a provision, section 3(d), that restricts patents on incremental pharmaceutical innovations. Its critics and supporters alike suggest that this provision makes Indian patent law very different from that in other jurisdictions. Yet there are concerns that given resource constraints facing the Indian patent office, this novel feature of Indian patent laws on the books may not have an effect on Indian patent prosecution in practice. We test this by examining the prosecution outcomes of 2,803 applications filed in both India and Europe, coded by whether they include claims that trigger 3(d) considerations. We find that having the 3(d) provision on the books does not translate into very different patent outcomes in practice in India, relative to Europe, a jurisdiction without this provision.

Link: https://read.dukeupress.edu/jhppl/article-abstract/38/4/735/13576/How-Do-Public-Health-Safeguards-in-Indian-Patent?redirectedFrom=fulltext.

Question 40

Sampat, Bhaven N., and Kenneth C. Shadlen. 2018. “Indian Pharmaceutical Patent Prosecution: The Changing Role of Section 3(d).” Edited by Joshua L. Rosenbloom. PLOS ONE 13 (4): e0194714. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0194714.

Abstract: India, like many developing countries, only recently began to grant pharmaceutical product patents. Indian patent law includes a provision, Section 3(d), which tries to limit grant of "secondary" pharmaceutical patents, i.e. patents on new forms of existing molecules and drugs. Previous research suggests the provision was rarely used against secondary applications in the years immediately following its enactment, and where it was, was redundant to other aspects of the patent law, raising concerns that 3(d) was being under-utilized by the Indian Patent Office. This paper uses a novel data source, the patent office's first examination reports, to examine changes in the use of the provision. We find a sharp increase over time in the use of Section 3(d), including on the main claims of patent applications, though it continues to be used in conjunction with other types of objections to patentability. More surprisingly, see a sharp increase in the use of the provision against primary patent applications, contrary to its intent, raising concerns about potential over-utilization.

Link: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0194714.

Question 41

Sampat, Bhaven N., and Kenneth C. Shadlen. 2017. “Secondary Pharmaceutical Patenting: A Global Perspective.” Research Policy 46 (3): 693–707. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2017.01.005.

Abstract: Pharmaceutical firms' use of secondary patents to extend periods of exclusivity generates concerns among policymakers worldwide. In response, some developing countries have introduced measures to curb the grant of these patents. While these measures have received considerable attention, there is limited evidence on their effectiveness. We follow a large sample of international patent applications in the US, Japan, the European Patent Office, and the corresponding filings in three developing countries with restrictions on secondary patents, India, Brazil, and Argentina. We compare primary vs. secondary grant rates across countries, consider the differential fates of "twin" applications filed in multiple countries, and across countries, and undertake detailed analyses of patent prosecution in the three developing countries. Our analyses indicate that measures to restrict secondary patents in developing countries are having limited impact. In none of these three countries are specific policies toward secondary patents the principal determinant of grant rates. Our analyses also suggest the importance of other procedural aspects of patent systems, beyond the formal policies targeting secondary applications that affect outcomes for these applications in developing countries.

Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048733317300057?via%3Dihub.

Question 42

UNCTAD, and ICTSD. 2005. Resource Book on TRIPS and Development. United States of America: Cambridge University Press. https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ictsd2005d1_en.pdf.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ictsd2005d1_en.pdf.

Question 43

United Nations Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines. 2016. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines: Promoting Innovation and Access to Health Technologies.” United Nations Development Programme. http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report.

Question 44

“Validation of European Patents in Tunisia (TN) with Effect from 1 December 2017 (Official Journal October 2017).” 2017. European Patent Office. October 31, 2017. https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/official-journal/2017/10/a85.html.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/official-journal/2017/10/a85.html.

Question 45

Velasquez, German. 2015. “Guidelines on Patentability and Access to Medicines.” Research Report no. 61. South Centre. https://www.southcentre.int/research-paper-61-march-2015/.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: https://www.southcentre.int/research-paper-61-march-2015/.

Question 46

Vieira, Marcela Fogaça, and Lorena Di Giano. 2018. “Taking on the Challenge of Implementing Public Health Safeguards on the ground.” In Routledge Handbook on the Politics of Global Health, edited by Richard Parker and Jonathan Garcia, 1st Edition. London: Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781315297255.

Abstract: The World Health Organization estimates that the deaths of 18 million people, one-third of all deaths, are caused by treatable medical conditions. In developing countries it has been a central point of concern and action for governments and health activists. In Brazil, the response to the Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus epidemic in the 1990s was based on a public policy of providing free antiretroviral treatment for all in need, which was possible especially through the local production of affordable generic drugs by national public laboratories. Since 2001, Brazil has adopted a double-step mechanism of examination of patent applications in the pharmaceutical sector. Argentina and Brazil have adopted public health safeguards in their national laws to reduce the negative impacts of intellectual property rules on access to medicines. Civil society organisations and patients’ groups have been engaged in litigation to use public health safeguards and also oppose attempts to introduce Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights-plus provisions in the Indian law.

Link: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781315297255.

Question 47

Villardi, Pedro. 2012. “Panorama Do Status Patentario e Registro Sanitario Dos Medicamentos Antiretrovirais No Brasil: Implicações Para o Acesso e Para a Politica Industrial de Saude.” ABIA - Associação Brasileira Interdisciplinar de AIDS. http://deolhonaspatentes.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Publica%C3%A7%C3%A3o-Pedro_Final_23OUT.pdf.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: http://deolhonaspatentes.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Publica%C3%A7%C3%A3o-Pedro_Final_23OUT.pdf.

Question 48

Wang, Xiangyu, Yuanqiong Hu, and Ping Jia. 2009. “Multi-Sector Approaches on Improving Access to ARVs in China.” In Intellectual Property Rights and Access to ARV Medicines: Civil Society Resistance in the Global South, edited by Renata Reis, Veriano Terto Júnior, Maria Cristina Pimenta, and Associação Brasileira Interdisciplinar de AIDS. Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil: ABIA. http://www.abiaids.org.br/_img/media/Intellectual_Property_internet.pdf.

Question 49

World Intellectual Property Organization. 2014. “Alternatives in Patent Search and Examination (Policy Guide).” https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_guide_patentsearch.pdf.

Abstract: Not available.

Link: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_guide_patentsearch.pdf.

Question 50

World Health Organization, Regional Office for South-East Asia. 2017. “Country Experiences in Using TRIPS Safeguards: Part I.” https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/272977/Country-experiences-TRIPS-Part1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

Abstract: Not available

Link: https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/272977/Country-experiences-TRIPS-Part1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

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Frequently Asked Questions

Amin, Tahir, and Aaron S. Kesselheim. 2012. “Secondary Patenting Of Branded Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study Of How Patents On Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended For Decades.” Health Affairs 31 (10): 2286–94. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2012.0107.

Beall, Reed F., Jason W. Nickerson, Warren A. Kaplan, and Amir Attaran. 2016. “Is Patent ‘Evergreening’ Restricting Access to Medicine/Device Combination Products?” Edited by Heinz Fehrenbach. PLOS ONE 11 (2): e0148939. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0148939.

Bensadon, Martin, and Ivan Alfredo Poli. 2012. “Prepare for Strict Rules against Pharmaceutical Patents.” Managing Intellectual Property, 2012. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/manintpr221&id=38&collection=journals&index=.

Bergström, Jenny. 2015. “The Efficiency of India’s Patent Layering Regime – Section 3(d) from Scientific Terminology to Patenting Implications.” IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 46 (6): 665–81. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-015-0375-3.

Blasi, Gabriel Di. 2018. “Reaching a Milestone in Pharmaceutical Patenting in Brazil.” Pharmaceutical Patent Analyst 7 (6): 229–33. https://doi.org/10.4155/ppa-2018-0025.

Abbas, Muhammad Z. 2019. “Evergreening of Pharmaceutical Patents: A Blithe Disregard for the Rationale of the Patent System.” Journal of Generic Medicines: The Business Journal for the Generic Medicines Sector 15 (2): 53–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/1741134319848797.

Abud, María José, Bronwyn Hall, and Christian Helmers. 2015. “An Empirical Analysis of Primary and Secondary Pharmaceutical Patents in Chile.” Edited by L. Michel Espinoza-Fonseca. PLOS ONE 10 (4): e0124257. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0124257.

Carrier, Michael A. 2019. “PRODUCT HOPPING: THE US APPROACH.” In EU Law of Competition and Trade in the Pharmaceutical Sector, by Pablo Figueroa and Alejandro Guerrero, 716–32. Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785362613.00028.

Correa, Carlos. 2007a. Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement. Oxford Commentaries on International Law. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Correa, Carlos. 2011a. “Pharmaceutical Innovation, Incremental Patenting and Compulsory Licensing.” Colombia: Fundacion Instituto para la Investigacion del Medicamento en los Sistemas de Salud. https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/47912/IDL-47912.pdf.

Correa, Carlos. 2011b. “Pharmaceutical Innovation, Incremental Patenting and Compulsory Licensing.” Research Paper no. 41. South Centre. https://www.southcentre.int/research-paper-41-september-2011/#more-1440.

Correa, Carlos. 2013. “Is Section 3(d) Consistent with TRIPS?” Economic and Political Weekly 48 (32): 49–52.

Correa, Carlos. 2014a. “Tackling the Proliferation of Patents: How to Avoid Undue Limitations to Competition and the Public Domain.” Research Paper no. 52. South Centre. https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/RP52_Tackling-the-Proliferation-of-Patents-rev_EN.pdf.

Correa, Carlos. 2014b. “Patent Examination and Legal Fictions: How Rights Are Created on Feet of Clay.” Research Paper no. 58. South Centre. https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/RP58_Patent-Examination-Legal-Fictions_EN.pdf.

Correa, Carlos. 2016a. “Implementing Pro-Competitive Criteria for the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents.” Research Paper no. 64. South Centre. https://ipaccessmeds.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ProCompetitive-Criteria-Examination-pharma-patents.pdf.

Correa, Carlos. 2016b. Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Patent Examination: Examining Pharmaceutical Patents from a Public Health Perspective. United Nations Development Program. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.1659.3526.

Drahos, Peter. 2008. “‘Trust Me’: Patent Offices in Developing Countries.” American Journal of Law & Medicine 34: 151–74. http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=EAIM&u=hei&id=GALE%7CA181990664&v=2.1&it=r.

Ducimetière, Clara. 2019. “Second Medical Use Patents - Legal Treatment and Public Health Issues.” South Centre. Research Papers 101. https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/RP101_Second-Medical-Use-Patents-Legal-Treatment-and-Public-Health-Issues_EN.pdf.

Dwivedi, Gaurav, Sharanabasava Hallihosur, and Latha Rangan. 2010. “Evergreening: A Deceptive Device in Patent Rights.” Technology in Society 32 (4): 324–30. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2010.10.009.

Feldman, Robin, and Connie Wang. 2017. “May Your Drug Price Be Ever Green.” SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3061567.

Hemphill, C. Scott, and Bhaven N. Sampat. 2012. “Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals.” Journal of Health Economics 31 (2): 327–39. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2012.01.004.

Holman, Christopher M. 2017. “In Defense of Secondary Pharmaceutical Patents: A Response to the UN’s Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Patent Examination.” Indiana Law Review 50: 759. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833983.

Holman, Christopher M., Timo Minssen, and Eric M. Solovy. 2018. “Patentability Standards for Follow-On Pharmaceutical Innovation.” Biotechnology Law Report 37 (3): 131–61. https://doi.org/10.1089/blr.2018.29073.cmh.

Kapczynski, Amy, Chan Park, and Bhaven Sampat. 2012. “Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of ‘Secondary’ Pharmaceutical Patents.” Edited by Barbara Mintzes. PLoS ONE 7 (12): e49470. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0049470.

Kunisawa, Mitsuuchi and Viviane Yumy. 2009. “Patenting Pharmaceutical Inventions on Second Medical Uses in Brazil.” The Journal of World Intellectual Property 12 (4): 297–316. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1796.2009.00362.x.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018. Making Medicines Affordable: A National Imperative. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/24946.

“PCT-Patent Prosecution Highway Pilot (PCT-PPH and Global PPH).” n.d. World Intellectual Property Organization. Accessed September 28, 2019. https://www.wipo.int/pct/en/filing/pct_pph.html.

Sampat, B. N., and T. Amin. 2013. “How Do Public Health Safeguards in Indian Patent Law Affect Pharmaceutical Patenting in Practice?” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 38 (4): 735–55. https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-2208594.

Sampat, Bhaven N., and Kenneth C. Shadlen. 2018. “Indian Pharmaceutical Patent Prosecution: The Changing Role of Section 3(d).” Edited by Joshua L. Rosenbloom. PLOS ONE 13 (4): e0194714. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0194714.

Sampat, Bhaven N., and Kenneth C. Shadlen. 2017. “Secondary Pharmaceutical Patenting: A Global Perspective.” Research Policy 46 (3): 693–707. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2017.01.005.

UNCTAD, and ICTSD. 2005. Resource Book on TRIPS and Development. United States of America: Cambridge University Press. https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ictsd2005d1_en.pdf.

“Validation of European Patents in Tunisia (TN) with Effect from 1 December 2017 (Official Journal October 2017).” 2017. European Patent Office. October 31, 2017. https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/official-journal/2017/10/a85.html.

Velasquez, German. 2015. “Guidelines on Patentability and Access to Medicines.” Research Report no. 61. South Centre. https://www.southcentre.int/research-paper-61-march-2015/.

World Intellectual Property Organization. 2014. “Alternatives in Patent Search and Examination (Policy Guide).” https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_guide_patentsearch.pdf.

World Health Organization, Regional Office for South-East Asia. 2017. “Country Experiences in Using TRIPS Safeguards: Part I.” https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/272977/Country-experiences-TRIPS-Part1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

Frequently Asked Questions

Amin, Tahir, and Aaron S. Kesselheim. 2012. “Secondary Patenting Of Branded Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study Of How Patents On Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended For Decades.” Health Affairs 31 (10): 2286–94. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2012.0107.

Beall, Reed F., Jason W. Nickerson, Warren A. Kaplan, and Amir Attaran. 2016. “Is Patent ‘Evergreening’ Restricting Access to Medicine/Device Combination Products?” Edited by Heinz Fehrenbach. PLOS ONE 11 (2): e0148939. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0148939.

Bensadon, Martin, and Ivan Alfredo Poli. 2012. “Prepare for Strict Rules against Pharmaceutical Patents.” Managing Intellectual Property, 2012. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/manintpr221&id=38&collection=journals&index=.

Bergström, Jenny. 2015. “The Efficiency of India’s Patent Layering Regime – Section 3(d) from Scientific Terminology to Patenting Implications.” IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 46 (6): 665–81. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-015-0375-3.

Blasi, Gabriel Di. 2018. “Reaching a Milestone in Pharmaceutical Patenting in Brazil.” Pharmaceutical Patent Analyst 7 (6): 229–33. https://doi.org/10.4155/ppa-2018-0025.

Abbas, Muhammad Z. 2019. “Evergreening of Pharmaceutical Patents: A Blithe Disregard for the Rationale of the Patent System.” Journal of Generic Medicines: The Business Journal for the Generic Medicines Sector 15 (2): 53–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/1741134319848797.

Abud, María José, Bronwyn Hall, and Christian Helmers. 2015. “An Empirical Analysis of Primary and Secondary Pharmaceutical Patents in Chile.” Edited by L. Michel Espinoza-Fonseca. PLOS ONE 10 (4): e0124257. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0124257.

Carrier, Michael A. 2019. “PRODUCT HOPPING: THE US APPROACH.” In EU Law of Competition and Trade in the Pharmaceutical Sector, by Pablo Figueroa and Alejandro Guerrero, 716–32. Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785362613.00028.

Correa, Carlos. 2007a. Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement. Oxford Commentaries on International Law. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Correa, Carlos. 2011a. “Pharmaceutical Innovation, Incremental Patenting and Compulsory Licensing.” Colombia: Fundacion Instituto para la Investigacion del Medicamento en los Sistemas de Salud. https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/47912/IDL-47912.pdf.

Correa, Carlos. 2011b. “Pharmaceutical Innovation, Incremental Patenting and Compulsory Licensing.” Research Paper no. 41. South Centre. https://www.southcentre.int/research-paper-41-september-2011/#more-1440.

Correa, Carlos. 2013. “Is Section 3(d) Consistent with TRIPS?” Economic and Political Weekly 48 (32): 49–52.

Correa, Carlos. 2014a. “Tackling the Proliferation of Patents: How to Avoid Undue Limitations to Competition and the Public Domain.” Research Paper no. 52. South Centre. https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/RP52_Tackling-the-Proliferation-of-Patents-rev_EN.pdf.

Correa, Carlos. 2014b. “Patent Examination and Legal Fictions: How Rights Are Created on Feet of Clay.” Research Paper no. 58. South Centre. https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/RP58_Patent-Examination-Legal-Fictions_EN.pdf.

Correa, Carlos. 2016a. “Implementing Pro-Competitive Criteria for the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents.” Research Paper no. 64. South Centre. https://ipaccessmeds.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ProCompetitive-Criteria-Examination-pharma-patents.pdf.

Correa, Carlos. 2016b. Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Patent Examination: Examining Pharmaceutical Patents from a Public Health Perspective. United Nations Development Program. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.1659.3526.

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